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However I have been studying this problem since I wrote a paper about the Mau
Mau uprising in Kenya in 1972 and I have seen exactly the same problem all over
the world. I know exactly what the problem is and I have an excellent idea how
to solve it.
The difference between several
tribes and a country is a legal infrastructure. There are two ways to create
this. You can use ruthless force or give the population an incentive to buy into
to the legal system. In Afghanistan you do not have overwhelming force and you
can’t be as ruthless as the Taliban. So you are going to have to get the tribes
to buy in.
The major obstacle is what a
game theorist would call relationship capital in a relationship based system.
(See professor Dixit, Lawlessness and Economics, 2004). A relationship based
system, sort of a prelaw system, unlike a rule based system, is based only on
trust. In these countries, trust is fostered by networks of family, clan,
religion, party affiliation mostly in that order. These relationships have what
is called relationship capital. In other words your relationships have enormous
value for both economic and preservation reasons.
To actually change this system
you have to replace relationship system with a rule based system. This process
is exceptionally difficult but might be accomplished gradually. As the
experience in Iraq showed, the first rule is to function with what exists. The
‘Sons of Iraq’ was created with the help of the local leaders, because they saw
it to their advantage.
One way to increase the
probability that the local leaders see the advantage is to ‘nudge’ them. (see
the book Nudge). You have to use behavioral economics to get the local leaders
to make choices that are appropriate to your overall strategy.
Once you get the local leaders
to opt in, because they see it in their best interests to do so, you have to
enlarge the process by showing leaders of different tribes that they gain mutual
benefit by cooperating on projects together. The process is the same whether you
are dealing with blacks and white in the US or Tajiks and Pashtuns in
Afghanistan.
Law can play a very important
role in this. In the 12th century, Henry II offered circuit judges in
competition with local manorial courts. The people preferred the circuit judges
because the results were better and fairer. Federal diversity jurisdiction has
the same effect in the US. If you want Afghanis to trust the law more than their
relationships, you have to offer them law that works. It has to be fast, fair,
simple and cheap.
The easiest place to start is
with commercial law. The World Bank in their doing business report has
identified numerous areas like bankruptcy and corporate formation that make the
economy more efficient. Usually you can start with these areas because they
affect a small number of people and are not politically or culturally sensitive.
The next important step is
contract enforcement. Protecting private property rights especially in contract
enforcement gives people a powerful economic incentive to use law rather than
relationships. It is also an area where you need cooperation across ethnic,
racial or religious lines. People don’t have to like each other to do business.
Once the economic incentives are in place, then the probability of people using
the law will increase. Using small incremental methods like this will eventually
build a state.
US policy has failed because
the locals in most of Afghanistan and especially in the Pashtun areas have no
incentives to cooperate and plenty of disincentives not to. On the contrary. The
US has framed the issue as us (Christian, westerners, Kabul elites, Tajiks)
against them (Muslims, Asians, locals, Pashtuns). Ideas and law are like
everything else. You have to market them. Show the benefits of your product, a
stable central government and intertribal cooperation, and the problems with
your competitors, an unstable anarchy.
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